Haut de la Garenne inquiry report leaked

Haut de la Garenne inquiry report leaked

Iselin Vale has been looking at a report compiled by Association of Chief Police Officers. A previously secret report into how Jersey police handled the Haut de la Garenne inquiry has been leaked by Senator Stuart Syvret.

The report, compiled two years ago by the Association of Chief Police Officers, includes 27 recommendations as to how the case should be dealt with.

Much of the report commends the police's handling of the case, including the scientific expertise and overall focus and approach applied.

But questions were raised about how to deal with victims no longer resident in the island and whether, as a matter of policy, all former residents at the home should be interviewed.

Questions were also raised about the seeming lack of care workers' files of former employees at Haut de la Garenne.

The report recognised that both victims and suspects in the inquiry might come under pressure, potentially leading them to flee or even harm themselves. Recommendation 12 suggests a strategy should be set up for dealing with such eventualities.

The most significant finding in the report related to Chief Officer Graham Power, who was suspended over his handling of the inquiry. The report noted he was not involved in the actual investigation, but had acted in an advisory capacity to the States. Recommendation 13 said it was key that this should continue, and that a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians be maintained.

Another observation related to senior investigating officer, Lenny Harper. The report noted the fact he was still undertaking his role as Deputy Chief Officer whilst being responsible for the strategic direction of the investigation-making excessive demands on him.

It was suggested that multi-tasking be avoided and that someone be appointed to free Lenny Harper of the duties of Deputy Chief Officer.

Lenny Harper came under fierce attack in the aftermath of the investigation, particularly for his media handling of what was thought to be a skull fragment recovered at the site. The fragment was probably a piece of coconut shell.

The report found his media handling to have been correctly managed. The full report is published below.

Report of the Association of Chief Police Officers, prepared for the States of Jersey Police in respect of the Historical Child Abuse Investigation.

March, 2008.

Operation Rectangle – Haute de le Garenne, Jersey

Homicide / Child Abuse Investigation

1.Initial Report – this is an initial report by the Association of Chief Police Officers Homicide Working Group's Advice team appointed to mentor and advise Mr. Lenny Harper, the Senior Investigating Officer for Operation Rectangle. This is a strategic report based on the team's findings when they visited Jersey from the 29th February 2008 to 2nd March 2008.

2. Mentoring – between the 23rd February 2008 and the 29th February 2008, Andy Baker has mentored and advised Lenny Harper on a needs basis by telephone from the UK. On arrival in Jersey the team visited the crime scene at Haute de la Garenne.

2.2 The team attended the morning meeting / briefing chaired by Mr Harper. The investigation is focused on searching and exhibit recovery at the former care home. This is the correct approach – it allows for recovery of exhibits and evidence, corroboration of accounts and allegations being made by witnesses and victims and ensures that public reassurance is addressed as to the integrity of the investigation. The morning management meeting / briefing was open and allowed for all attendees to contribute. Some observations were made resulting in the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: That an agenda is prepared for this (and other meetings) and a minute taker records the salient points and any decisions and any actions arising.

Recommendation 2: That the deputy SIO (Detective Inspector Keith Bray) provides an update of any points of interest that includes – the MIR, the Outside Enquiry Team, Analysis and Intelligence Cell. In key areas, consideration should be given to inviting colleagues responsible for these areas of the investigation.

3. The search parameters / crime scene management.

3.1 The whole scene is well cordoned off and the media corralled in an area away from the entrance to the site. Although some cameramen had gained access to private accommodation and public land overlooking the external excavation areas to the rear of the site. There is good use of the parish police in controlling the cordons. A record is kept of everyone entering and leaving the grounds. High visibility policing is clear and sufficient control rooms, lighting and scene tents are available where required.

3.2 The Crime Scene Manager (Vicky Coupland) referred to the whole site as the crime scene and focused on the cellar rooms in particular.

3.3 At the morning meeting / briefing they discussed the incident where reports suggest that human bones were found in 2003 and shown to the pathologist who decided they were in fact animal bones. The builder however has since reported that he felt that some were human bones. The existence of the bones were not immediately brought to the attention of the police back in 2003. That specific allegation is not being investigated at the current time but the information is being used to assist with the areas to be excavated and searched by the team. This is the correct approach as the team must focus on the child abuse allegations and the homicide investigation – with relation to the partial piece of a child's cranium (skull) and not be diverted into other areas.

3.4 The team also attended a briefing for the officers undertaking excavation and fingertip search. This was given by Vicky Coupland (the Crime Scene Manager), Julie Roberts (Forensic Anthropologist), Carl Harrison (Archaeologist) and Martin Grimes (Search Expert / Human Remains Dog Handler). This was a thorough briefing that covered requirements, what is to be looked for and what action to be taken if anything was found or any questions raised. This is a good use of scientific expertise and reassures the officers undertaking the dig to be thorough and raise any concerns however apparently irrelevant or small.

3.5 The Archaeology / Anthropology recovery and identification will take a long time with the current process being undertaken manually. Is it possible to speed this up via another process, e.g. mechanical sifter in a production line basis staffed by police and being supervised by Archaeologist / Anthropologist?
Recommendation 3: That the SIO considers a mechanical process for sifting debris.

4. Forensic and exhibits strategies.

4.1 The SIO has a Forensic / Exhibit Policy book. This was read and is being completed in the correct fashion. The Crime Scene Manager is packaging any exhibits and recording them at the scene. However, following a visit to the Major Incident Room (MIR), where the team spoke to the disclosure / exhibit officer, it was soon identified that there are in fact three exhibit stores. One at the scene (managed by the Crime Scene Manager), one on police premises off-site (the cage) and one secure store within the MRI. There is also a freezer in the MRI that has a young female's femur retained therein. The exhibit officer is correctly entering exhibit details in the Holmes account. He has not however recorded details of the 16 exhibits held by the Crime Scene Manager at the care home. These have been requested but the Crime Scene Manager wants to submit a full and inclusive statement once the scene examination and exhibit recovery is completed. This should be recorded as policy in the policy book and can be attended to in another manner.

Recommendation 4: That the three exhibit sites be detailed in the policy book. That the Crime Scene Manager provides a statement that details the exhibits and could include a time line, e.g. “these are the exhibits recovered at the Haut de la Garenne care home between the 1st January 2008 and the 1st March 2008. The examination of the scene has not been completed and further exhibits will be correctly recorded and submitted at appropriate periods.”

5. Witness and victim strategies — specifically interview and Family Liaison Officers / Family Liaison Coordinators

5.1 There is good practice identified from the Witness / Victim policy book. These include - an integrity promise form (between the police and the witness); initial research and risk assessment of potential witnesses; and risk assessment of witnesses.

5.2 The enquiry has vetted all staff to ensure they were not residents at the care home.

5.3 Currently, the first police officer having contact with any victim is being considered and appointed as their family liaison officer. They may well be untrained in this demanding role. It is understandable why this decision was made but should be reviewed for the following reasons: if the first officer will now often be a contractor from the UK or a police officer on mutual aid and may not be on the enquiry for an extended period; the numbers of victims are growing; many victims will become significant and will be engaged with for a prolonged period through trial; and some victims may subsequently suffer as a result of coming forward, giving a statement or giving evidence (that may be over a prolonged period of time).

Recommendation 5: That the SIO review this position and seeks advice from his trained Family Liaison Co-ordinator and, through Detective Sergeant Teresa Russell NPIA, seeks advice from Detective Constable Duncan McGarry (NPIA).

5.5 The use of the NSPCC for both third party recording and ongoing care and referral for counselling is good practice.

5.6 The SIO has amended the process for evidential capture from the victims. Originally it was by way of Audio / Video interview with a covering statement but was amended to now also be followed with a full written statement. Subject to the Law of Evidence in Jersey. The SIO should review this position and ensure that this is duly recorded in the policy log as presently there is confusion within the team and in the logs. This team provided the deputy SIO with advice papers on such strategies.

Recommendation 6: That the SlO ensures that his policy for presenting victims' evidence to the courts is recorded in the policy log. Further advice can be obtained from Gary Shaw National Interview Advisor (NPIA) through Teresa Russell.

5.7 The enquiry team have been contacted by victims from all over the World. Enquiry officers have travelled to Australia and victims now live in the USA. Thailand and other countries. There is no apparent policy for dealing with victims who live off the Island, in the UK or beyond.

5.8 The Cage exhibit room holds a high volume of care home residents' files. These are taken and added to the Holmes account and exhibited as and when the witness comes forward to police. What is the strategy regarding interviewing all residents (or not)?

Recommendation 7: The SIO should consider whether all residents will be interviewed (or not)?

Recommendation 8: The SI0 should consider a policy for dealing with such victims and record it as a matter of policy.

6. Arrest and prosecution strategies (police perspective only)

6.1 Policy decision 2 details the investigation threshold of 'serious indictable offences'. This is good practice at an early stage which allows the team to focus on the most serious offences and not be diverted by minor assaults that could have amounted to 'the moderate correction of a child’.

6.2 One suspect - Wateridge has already been charged with criminal offences of indecent assault based on multiple victims and similar fact evidence. The team do not question this decision but raise a concern if this individual was in fact a more serious offender and is arraigned before all allegations are received.

Recommendation 9: The SIO should discuss Wateridge with the Prosecuting authority.

6.3 The SIO has publicly stated that arrests will be made following a full and thorough investigation of any allegation. The arrest strategy must be recorded in the policy files.

Recommendation 10: The SIO must detail any arrest strategies in the Policy Files.

6.4 The existence (or not) of care workers files who were employed at the home is unclear. Where are the files of all the care workers at the home?

Recommendation 11: The SIO should ascertain from the proper authorities, and recover, any records or files of people who worked at the home (following advice from the data protection officer).

6.5 The excavation and abuse allegations may well take a protracted period of time. The victims and suspects will reflect on the incidents and allegations and both may well come under some pressure and the latter may well flee and hide in countries around the world. The SIO must give some consideration to these possibilities.

Recommendation 12: The SIO must set strategies for contingencies of victims and suspects harming themselves and the likelihood of suspects fleeing to other countries.

7. Governance of the Investigation

Resilience —

7.1 Other than from a supervisory and responsibility standpoint Mr Graham Power Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police is not involved in the actual investigation. He is, and has been, responsible for attending to any issues of a political nature or in an advisory capacity to the Chief Minister, Ministers and politicians. It is very important that this continues to protect the investigation and allow for the investigation to be unfettered by any demands.

Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.

7.2 The SIO (Lenny Harper), Deputy SIO (Keith Bray) and Office Manager (Detective Sergeant Dave Hill) have high demands on them as individuals and their time is spread thinly. To aid them and provide an independent sounding board Andy Baker has offered to continue mentoring the SIO; Anne Harrison has offered to mentor Keith Bray; and John Mooney has offered to mentor Dave Hill.

Recommendation 14: That key members of investigation team consider the offer of specific mentors from this team.

7.3 The SIO is responsible for the strategic direction of the investigation. He makes and records the decisions. Quite rightly he is focusing on the scene and the high media demands. However, he is still undertaking his role as deputy chief officer and this is making excessive demands on him. The deputy SIO must take responsibility for the MIR and the inquiry team. He is responsible for ensuring that the SIO is informed of all matters important so he can, in turn, make decisions and direct the investigation. The deputy SIO must also co-ordinate the briefing material for the SIO and the other lead role players as well as keeping the team apprised of developments and that everything is correctly recorded on the Holmes system. The Office Manager is responsible for the management of the Holmes suite. These roles must be adhered to and resilience provided.

Recommendation 15: That the SIO, deputy SIO and Office Manager are allowed to concentrate on their roles and multi tasking of them is avoided.

Recommendation 16: That the Chief Officer considers appointing someone to temporarily undertake the duties of deputy chief officer.

7.4 It is understood that the current deputy SIO, Keith Bray, is to retire in May 2008. Arrangements are in hand to ensure he is replaced by Detective Inspector Allison Fossey. This is good succession planning.

7.5 There are presently thirteen staff on the inquiry team but arrangements are in hand for an additional twelve detectives to be attached from the UK. The investigation was declared a critical incident and a Cat A+ by the SIO - decision number 8. He also decided not to hold a Gold Strategy group or complete a Community Impact Assessment (CIA). The reasons for the lack of a CIA are shown with regard to his concerns of possible suspects in public offices. A CIA can be wholly internal to the police and one should be considered. To assist such an Independent Advisory Group could be convened for this specific investigation / enquiry. This team are more than content to assist with this proposal.

Recommendation 17: That the Chief Officer and SIO consider a Community Impact Assessment and convene an Independent Advisory Group. The IAG should not include former residents at this home, could include advisors from the NSPCC or community groups. The IAG could advise on the CIA.

Media Strategy

8.1 There is a media policy file and press cuttings are collated and retained.

8.2 In viewing the media cuttings, there is clear evidence of witnesses providing accounts of what occurred in the home and there exists wide media speculation (even some of the graphics of the cellar area are incorrect). The SIO has, wherever possible, refuted wide suggestions and, at appropriate times, refused to confirm sensitive information to minimise sensationalism.

8.2 The investigation has three media officers to provide resilience and cover. This meets the demand and can be reviewed as and when that demand changes. The media managers must ensure they: pre-brief the media as to their expectations at any conference — what will happen, how questions are to be asked (introducing themselves by name and organisation), how many questions or period of time allowed for questions (NB; this is partly covered in the media policy file) and make comprehensive notes of what is said and by whom to the media.

8.3 During the briefing that this team attended on the 1st March 2008 possible interference with witnesses was raised and discussed in some detail. The advice team felt that a hard stance should be taken on this specific issue to reassure any victims and potential witnesses that they will be protected and that the law will prevail. The SIO was advised accordingly. It is worthy of note that at his first opportunity provided at the first media interview and subsequent briefings on the 1st March that the police position on any interference was strongly outlined. The media have reported this position and the IAG could be invited to for a view in any future situations.

8.4 The SIO has retained an open mind with regard to the piece of skull that was recovered. He acknowledges that it could be quite dated not be from a murder. He is treating the case as a homicide investigation until he can prove otherwise. The piece of a child's skull was found in suspicious circumstances and the SIO was correct to state to the media that this was a homicide investigation but that the human remains may be found to be not subject of any violent act. Forensic test to identify the piece of bone may take another four weeks (carbon dating and subsequent DNA). The circumstances as to its provenance may then be clearer. He still, however, leads an investigation into a number of allegations with regard to children going missing, a history of recovered and discarded human bones and an extremely complex historical child abuse investigation. Until the contrary is proved, the SIO is dealing with allegations of homicide, serious sexual assaults and prolonged periods of child abuse within a care home.

8.5 Internal media to keep all staff up-to-date is important. The media officers should put together an internal media process and ensure it is kept current.

Recommendation 18: The media officers should put together an internal media process and ensure it is kept current.

9. The HOLMES Suite and Account

General Comments

9.1 The team visited the Major Incident Room (MIR) on 1 March 2008. The MIR was effectively closed over the weekend.

9.2 They met Detective Inspector Keith Bray (the deputy SIO); Detective Sergeant Dave Hill (the Office Manager); Bob de La Cour (Disclosure / Exhibit officer); Tony Williams (Analyst); and Lynn Lang (Intelligence Officer).

9.3 Sergeant Hill has been given the responsibility of the Office Manager, Receiver and Action Manager within the MIR. He is also responsible for supervision of some of the outside enquiry team. Sergeant Hill showed enthusiasm, dedication and is obviously keen and willing to learn given the duties he has taken on.

9.4 The basic MIR organisation is Devon and Cornwall based with D&C officers assisting in staffing the MIR. They also gave Sgt Hill ‘on the job' training (believed to be three days for a two week course) to perform the roles he is now undertaking within the MIR.

9.5 The incident was created from a combination of smaller enquiries involving the care home at Haute de la Garenne. The incident has been given the Operational name ‘Operation Rectangle - Jersey Historic Child Abuse’. States of Jersey Police do not have their own HOLMES 2 system and therefore are linked back to Devon and Cornwall's server.

9.6 The staff within the MIR, in addition to Sgt H, consists of a Document Reader, 2 Indexers, a Disclosure / Exhibits officer and a typist. The staff is a mix of D&C staff, States of Jersey personnel and agency staff.

9.7 The SIO's policy file has not been entered onto the HOLMES account to date. The Indexers Policy File is based on a generic D&C Indexers Policy File with inserts for the specific Incident. The initial enquiry required a fairly large Back Record Conversation (BRC) to allow all of the Documentation to be viewable and searchable on HOLMES. It is anticipated this was carried out on recommendation by experienced D&C staff and although laborious assists in pump-priming the incident.

9.8 The initial view of the incident statistics shows the main ones as:
• 740 Nominals;
• 599 Actions; and
• A total number of 1342 Documents including 888 Other Documents (mostly from the BRC).

9.9 It is apparent, from the Documents awaiting processing that additional staff are required to assist a decent volume of flow for the incident documentation.

9.10 Currently the flow for the volume of documentation appears to be bottle-necked at:
a) - the Receivers ‘in tray: and
b) - the Management of Actions. i.e. what is relevant to current Lines of Enquiry.

9.11 As an example, at the time of viewing the Action Queue Manager (AQM) there are 222 Actions For Allocation and approximately 200 Allocated to the fairly small enquiry team. It also shows only 1 ‘For Referrer and 18 Referred’. Managing Actions is ultimately the responsibility of the SIO. However given the complexity of the Incident overall it is suggested that the Deputy SIO could be delegated this responsibility in conjunction with a dedicated Action Manager (see below) to alleviate this task and thus provide a means of prioritising the Actions to the Lines of Enquiry identified.

9.12 It was also noted that some 100+ Messages await processing in the in tray of the Receiver, together with Returned Actions that also contain additional documentation. This will generate another batch of Actions that will require rigorous management by the Deputy SIO and Action Manager.

9.13 The SIO is aware of a requirement to provide additional resources and has set this process in motion via letters to address this situation. To date these relate to twelve outside inquiry officers and four more indexers. However, more staff are required in the roles of Receiver, Action Allocator and Typists.

9.14 The MIR staff and Enquiry team also take calls from the freephone helpline, often from Victims / Witnesses that will generate additional work. They may also become the designated FLO as they could be the first contact officer. This is a very important aspect of the enquiry but does not assist the efficiency of the MIR flow.

9.15 Currently the MIR sits beside the enquiry team and also acts as the centre for calls as a result of the freephone appeal for Victims and Witnesses. On visiting the MIR Sgt H who performs the combined roles of OM, Receiver, Action Manager, took at least 6 calls from members of the public, some of whom were clearly distressed. Whilst he dealt with the calls in a very sympathetic and expert manner, it obviously detracts from his core duties of running the MIR.

Initial Recommendations In Relation to the MIR

Recommendation 19: That other accommodation is found for the enquiry team and that the MIR is extended to the current room used by the enquiry team. This may allow the Document Reader / OM / Deputy SIO to use the current MIR for work that requires a quieter environment. States of Jersey Police recognised this from the upsurge in calls over recent days and are in the process of addressing this matter.

Recommendation 20: That the call centre phones are located elsewhere and have a “relevant” number of dedicated call-takers with appropriate skills. This call centre can be staffed during office hours and have a suitable answering message for other times. This will fluctuate depending on the media coverage etc, but best practice is to enhance numbers initially as it’s then easier to stand people down. This call centre should include child abuse trained officers.

Recommendation 21: Through Mutual Aid a dedicated experienced Receiver and a dedicated experienced Action Manager are found for the MIR. (These roles may, at some time in the future, be able to be combined when the incident volumes settle down). Additional typing staff should also be identified and posted to the MIR.

Recommendation 22: The Deputy SIO should review the Actions queues on behalf of the SIO to focus the MIR to the relevant lines of enquiry. The Deputy SIO should undertake this review with a dedicated Action Manager over the course of a day or two, this would allow the number to be dramatically reduced to relevant Actions with the remainder being put to “For Referral” or “referred”. It should be noted that they would still be searchable in those queues should they become relevant as the enquiry continues. This would assist to “clear the ground” from under their feet to allow a clearer focus on what Actions are relevant.

Recommendation 23: That there should be assurance that all of the good work being done for the enquiry at the various locations and countries is captured via relevant documentation associated to the incident Actions. For example the work by the search dog; the work by the Archaeological digs etc. One option may be to feed synopses of work being done by experts into the MIR via the coordinating SOCO which should be controlled via Actions. Such documents could be “living documents” on a daily basis to be typed up. This would form a good source of intelligence / update information for the SIO rather than having to rely on minutiae detail from each and every area.

9.16 There are potential issues of multi case elements, e g. separate charges and prosecutions. Within the MIR everything is contained on the one incident that could generate a number of separate prosecutions. The work required around issues such as Disclosure and how it is separated will become very important. If there is no plan towards how to separate the individual files this may cause problems and additional work at a later date.

9.17 There will inevitably be ‘cross-overs' of Nominals who will be abused, abusers and witnesses. This will add to the complexities of separating out the different Investigations.

It is suggested that an SIO (Andy Tattrshall GMP) with previous experience of such abuse cases together with a Disclosure expert (Ian Lloyd or Graham Marshall, West Midlands Police) are Invited through Teresa Russell to apprise and advise the best way to do this that will comply with Disclosure advice, best practice and regulations.

Recommendation 24: That all policy files are recorded on the Holmes account so staff are able to access them.

10. Analysis strategy / procedures.

10.1 There is a dedicated intelligence cell with a robust procedure to ensure that information is protected but still recorded on the Holmes account.

10.2 The analyst has utilised 12 to good effect in producing timelines of residents at the care home, linkage charts of victims, suspects etc. He has the capacity to make more rapid progress but is impeded due to speed with which information is being typed into the system and the lack of confirmed staff / suspect information.

10.3 The enquiry will benefit from some of his work being displayed in both the MIR and the enquiry team’s office.

11. Any other relevant strategy that needs to be considered.

11.1 It is understood that there is one victim from the home who may be wanted for child abuse offences within the London area. The investigation team should consider this issue in any risk assessment conducted on the victims as well as the suspects.

Recommendation 25: The SIO should consider this issue in any risk assessment conducted on the victims as well as the suspects.

11.2 There is a lack of trained staff within the MIR, e.g. Sgt Hill and the Analyst limited to on the job training received (not HOLMES trained). Consideration should be given to investing in both a full HOLMES system for States of Jersey Police and the requisite training for staff.

Recommendation 26: Consideration should be given to investing in both a full HOLMES system for States of Jersey Police and the requisite training for staff.

Recommendation 27: That the States of Jersey Police consider all the recommendations and take appropriate action. It is suggested that this team returns to Jersey in four weeks time to review progress of the recommendations, revisit the enquiry and make further recommendations as appropriate.

Haut de la Garenne inquiry report leaked